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MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION PLAN
WITHDRAWAL LIABILITY:
LIMITATIONS WITHOUT LIMITS
Congress enacted the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 ("MPPAA ") to provide greaterfinancial security for pension funds. Under the MPPAA, an employer who withdraws from a pension plan is liable to the plan for its share of
unfunded, vested benefits. Section 1451 of the MPPAA creates a
civil action allowing pension plans to collect the withdrawal liability. The author considers the timing of collection actions, focusing
specifically on the statute of limitations provisions in section 1451.
The author asserts that delays in collecting withdrawal liability
often impose significant burdens on employers. He argues that
courts have construed the statute of limitations in a manner which
deprives employers of the protection from delinquent actions such
laws are intended to provide. Finally, the author suggests a construction of the statute that balances pension funds' need to collect
withdrawal liability with the inequities that may fall upon employers as a result of delayed collection actions.

INTRODUCTION

Congress passed the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments
Act of 1980 ("MPPAA") in an effort to refine the treatment of
multiemployer pension plans2 under the Employee Retirement In-

1. Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5,
26 & 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Pub. L. No. 96-364].
2. The preamble to the MPPAA states its purpose: "to improve retirement income
security under private employer pension plans by strengthening the funding requirements
for those plans, to authorize plan preservation measures for financially troubled
multiemployer pension plans, and to revise the manner in which the pension plan termination insurance provisions apply to multiemployer plans ... .- Id.
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come Security Act ("ERISA").3 Under the MPPAA, an employer
who withdraws from a pension plan is liable to the plan for an
amount equal to the employer's share of unfunded vested benefits.4 The amount of withdrawal liability imposed is often substantial, especially to a firm that is forced to withdraw from a plan due
to an economic downturn.
Timing of the collection of withdrawal liability is an important
issue for both the collecting pension fund and the withdrawing
employer. While pension funds desire payment of withdrawal liability as soon as possible, most employers presumably want to defer
payment of withdrawal liability. In some circumstances, however,
employers will suffer damages over and above their actual liability
to the pension fund because of a significant delay between the
withdrawal and the fund's demand for withdrawal liability. An
employer, for example, may discard plan records in the mistaken
belief that it is no longer liable for any payments under the plan.
When the pension fund subsequently demands withdrawal liability,
such an employer would not be in a position to question the validity or accuracy of the fund's calculations. Alternatively, the firm
may be sold to a purchaser who is not aware of the pending liability and who is, therefore, also unable to question the pension
fund's calculations. Moreover, such a purchaser will have paid
more for the firm than it was actually worth since the sale price
would not have reflected all of the firm's liabilities. Statutes of
limitation were enacted to eliminate problems of this nature.5
Section 1451 of the MPPAA creates a civil action allowing
certain parties to seek equitable or legal relief under the Act.6
Disputes over withdrawal liability are specifically assigned to resolution through arbitration.7 In section 1451(f) of the Act, Congress

3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989).
4. Id. § 1381. See also H.R. REP. No. 869, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 67, reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2918, 2933 (discussing the imposition of withdrawal liability to eliminate the burden on remaining employers).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 33-36.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 1451(a)(1). This provision states that
[a] plan fiduciary, employer, plan participant, or beneficiary, who is adversely
affected by the act or omission of any party under this subtitle with respect to
a multiemployer plan, or an employee organization which represents such a
plan participant or beneficiary for purposes of collective bargaining, may bring
an action for appropriate legal or equitable relief, or both.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1) ("Any dispute between an employer and the plan sponsor
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adopted a statute of limitations providing that:
an action under this section may not be brought after
the later of (1) 6 years after the date on which the cause of
action arose, or
(2) 3 years after the earliest date on which the
plaintiff acquired or should have acquired actual knowledge
of the existence of such cause of action; except that in the
case of fraud or concealment, such action may be brought
not later than 6 years after the date of discovery of the
existence of such cause of action.8
The operation and application of section 1451(f) depends upon
determining the exact time the cause of action arose. Unfortunately,
the statute does not offer a method for making that determination.
In the first six years of the Act's existence, courts were able to
dodge this issue because no cases fell outside the initial six-year
period specified in the statute. Since 1986, however, courts have
faced this issue with increasing frequency.
This note examines the limitation-of-action issues that arise in
the context of the withdrawal liability provisions of the MPPAA.
Specifically, this note analyzes the current demand-default approach
that prevails in the courts for adjudicating claims for withdrawal
liability as they relate to section 1451(f). This note also considers
the various responses available to an employer when a
multiemployer pension plan, years after an alleged complete or
partial withdrawal by an employer, demands payment of withdrawal
liability. The analysis which follows reveals the inadequacy of
these responses and the need for a more equitable doctrine for
tolling the statute of limitations.
Part I of this note reviews ERISA, the MPPAA, the mechanics
of withdrawal liability collection and the problems employers face
due to the inequitable application of the statute of limitations in
section 1451(f) of the MPPAA. Part II focuses on a statutory anal-

of a multiemployer plan concerning a determination made under sections 1381 through
1399 [the withdrawal provisions] of this title shall be resolved through arbitration."). See
International Ass'n of Machinists Nat'l Pension Fund v. Clinton Engines Corp., 825 F.2d
415, 422 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that "arbitration reigns supreme under the MPPAA").
See generally Steven P. Kenkel, The Supremacy of Arbitration in the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, 56 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 815, 815-16 (1988) (discussing the mandatory arbitration policy for disputes over the amount of withdrawal liability).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 1451(f).
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ysis of section 1451 and on the equitable defenses available to an
employer faced with a claim for withdrawal liability. Part II of the
note proposes an "as soon as practicable" test for tolling the statute
of limitations. This test provides an equitable method for balancing
a fund's desire to collect withdrawal liability with the potential
inequities that may fall upon an employer.
I.

HISTORY AND MECHANICS OF THE

,PPAA's WITHDRAWAL

LIABILrrY PROVISIONS

A.

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act

In 1974, after years of consideration and study,9 Congress
passed ERISA.10 As a justification for passing the Act, Congress
expressed concern for "the continued well-being and security of
millions of employees and their dependents" who relied on pension
plans which, "owing to the inadequacy of current minimum standards," were unsound and unstable." President Gerald Ford described ERISA as "that massive bill" and heralded it as legislation
that would "give more benefits and rights and success in the area
of labor-management than almost anything in the history of this
12

country."

ERISA not only created the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC"), 13 but also imposed a comprehensive regulatory

9. See Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)
(noting that Congress enacted ERISA "following almost a decade of studying the nation's
private pension plans").
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461.
11. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a). Generally, courts cite to the United States Code when referencing ERISA provisions. However, employee benefit practitioners generally cite to the
sections of the uncodified Act. For ease of reference, this note will include both citations.
See JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. woLK, Pension and Employee Benefit Law 73
(1990) [hereinafter LANGBEIN & WOLK].
As a further complication of ERISA practice, some ERISA provisions are codified in
the Internal Revenue Code and Congress did not correlate these provisions to make the
citations easily reconcilable or recognizable. Commentators have criticized the clumsiness
of the organization and numbering of ERISA. See id. (noting as an example ERISA
§ 403(a), which discusses the fiduciary duty of mandatory trusteeship while IRC § 403(a)
discusses an unrelated topic, the taxation of annuitized distributions).
12. Remarks on Signing the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub.
Papers 1974, 76, 76-77 (Sept. 2, 1974). In the spirit of Labor Day, Ford extolled the bill
as an example of the cooperation possible not only between labor and management, but
also between the houses of Congress and the executive branch. Id. at 77. Ford's comments underscore the political realities of ERISA's significance.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (charging the PBGC with the duty of encouraging the "continuation and maintenance" of voluntary private pension plans, providing "timely and unin-
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scheme generally preempting all state employee-benefit laws. 14
Prior to 1980, the PBGC secured benefits under multiemployer
plans at its discretion." When Congress reviewed ERISA's treatment of multiemployer plans in 1980, there were 2,000 covered
multiemployer plans with a total of 8 million participants.16 In
1982, approximately 2,500 multiemployer plans covering 8.5 million active or retired participants and over 700,000 employers existed.17 By 1987, these figures increased to approximately 3,000
multiemployer plans covering 9.7 million participants."8
Employers participating in a multiemployer pension plan contribute to the fund based on a variety of factors such as the number of hours worked, a percentage of compensation or units of
production (e.g., tons of coal mined). 9 Thus, while the plans pay
pensions like (and for statutory purposes are classified as) defined
benefit plans, the pension plans usually are funded like defined
contribution plans.2" An attractive feature of multiemployer plans

terrupted payment of pension benefits" under covered plans, and maintaining the lowest
level of premiums consistent with its statutory obligations).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) ("Mhis chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar
as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan [covered].") Two major
exceptions to preemption are the savings clause and the deemer clause. The savings clause
provides that "nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any
person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities." 29
U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). The second exception provides that "[n]either an employee benefit
plan ... nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance
company . . . for purposes of any law . . . purporting to regulate insurance companies . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
15. See Kenkel, supra note 7, at 816 (noting the extensions of PBGC discretion to pay
benefits to the beneficiaries of terminated multiemployer pension plans). The PBGC was
originally authorized to exercise its discretion with respect to multiemployer plan benefits
until January 1, 1978; authority was subsequently extended to June 30, 1979 and then
May 1, 1980. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (amended in Pub. L. No. 95-214, 91 Stat. 1501 (1977) and Pub. L. No. 96-24,
93 Stat. 70 (1979)).
16. H.R. REP. No. 869, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 1, at 52 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2918, 2920 [hereinafter H.R. REP. 96-869] (Committee on Education and
Labor Report stating the reasons for the MPPAA).
17. EMPLOYEE BENEFrr RESEARCH INsTuTE, FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENFI
PROGRAMS 55-56 (3d ed. 1987).
18. EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTrru,
FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFr
PROGRAMS 63 (4th ed. 1990).
19. H.R. REP. 96-869, supra note 16, at 53, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2921.
20. See RUSSELL K. OSGOODE, THm LAW OF PENSION AND PRoFiT-SHARING § 9.3.3
(1984) (pointing out that multiemployer pension plans are poorly funded because employers usually determine the fixed amount of their contributions without regard to the defined
benefit set in the sponsor's plan); see also LANGBEIN & WoLK, supra note 11, at 50
(quoting Osgoode).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:255

is that they allow employees who work for several employers in
the same industry to collect all of their benefits from one fund.
This increased pension portability was one of the goals of pension
regulation. 2'
An employer's obligation to contribute to a multiemployer plan
generally ends upon the employer's withdrawal. Under ERISA's
original provisions, the remaining employers contributing to the
fund were liable for the unfunded benefits owed to the employees
of the withdrawn employer.' These provisions created several
problems for those employers still contributing to the pension fund.
For example, in a declining industry, withdrawals due to plant
closings are common. These withdrawls ultimately exacerbate the
financial distress of the remaining employers contributing to the
plan.23 ERISA's original termination liability provisions had the
added problem of creating an incentive for employers to withdraw
from the fund early while unfunded liabilities were relatively low
and termination within five years was not expected. As a result,
the remaining employers who continued to contribute to the plan
were subjected to increased financial pressure. ERISA thus created
conditions under which the last remaining employers were liable
for contributions owed by former plan participants.
B.

The MPPAA: Policy Goals and a Means of Implementation

In the MPPAA, Congress addressed concerns about
multiemployer plans and eliminated the PBGC's discretion over
whether or not to guaranty multiemployer plans. 24 Recognizing the
21. See H.R. REP. 96-869, supra note 16, at 65, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2933. "Underlying the policy [of the Act] is the recognition that multiemployer plans, by
providing pension portability, and protecting the benefits earned by employees whose
employers have withdrawn from a plan, have insured the pensions of millions of Americn workers." See also LANOBEIN AND WOLK, 52 (noting that pension protability was a
major unfulfilled goal of ERISA).
22. Withdrawing employers did have to provide a bond securing liability in case the
plan terminated within five years of the employer's withdrawal. H.R. REP. 96-869, supra
note 16, at 54, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2922. Employers who withdraw from a
plan during the five years which precede the termination of the plan remain liable for up
to 30 percent of the net worth of unfunded guaranteed benefits. At Beyond the five-year
bonded period, the withdrawn employer had no liability for the unfunded benefits. Id. See
also 29 U.S.C. § I144(b)(2).
23. H.R. REP. 96-869, supra note 16, at 54, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2922.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 1322a. Congress replaced "the termination insurance program for
multiemployer pension plans with an insolvency-based benefit protection program [intended
to] enhance the financial soundness of such plans, place primary emphasis on plan continuation, and contain program costs with reasonable limits." Id § 1001a.
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concerns of multiemployer critics, Congress observed that "withdrawals of contributing employers from a multiemployer pension
plan frequently result in substantially increased funding obligations
for employers who continue to contribute to the plan, adversely
affecting the plan, its participants and beneficiaries, and labor-management relations. . . ."2 Consequently, in one of the most significant provisions of the MPPAA, Congress imposed liability on
withdrawing employers in order "to relieve the funding burden on
remaining employers and to eliminate the incentive to pull out of a
plan which would result if liability were imposed only on a mass
withdrawal by all employers. 2 6 The MPPAA also imposes liability for partial withdrawal when an employer makes lower contributions due to a decline in business. 27 Perceiving the greatest
threat against multiemployer plans to be "the protracted decline in
covered employment experienced by some plans," the MPPAA was
designed to insulate plans through withdrawal liability and by
eliminating incentives for employers to leave plans early.28
To collect amounts owed by an employer, plan sponsors must
first notify the withdrawn employer of the amount owed, devise a
schedule for payment, and demand payment according to the
schedule.2 9 The employer then has 90 days in which it may raise
specific objections and request the plan sponsor to review its original findings, point out "any inaccuracy in the determination of the
amount of the unfunded benefit allocable to the employer" and
provide "any additional relevant information to the plan sponsor."30 Both parties have 60 days after the initial notification and
demand, or 120 days after the plan sponsor's response to the request for further review, to initiate arbitration proceedings to resolve their dispute.31 Finally, within 30 days of an arbitration
25. 29 U.S.C. § 1001a(a)(4)(A). Congress also found that "in a declining industry, the
incidence of employer withdrawals is higher and the adverse effects . . . are exacerbated." Id § 100la(a)(4)(B).
26. H.R. REP. 96-869, supra note 16, at 67, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2935.
27. Partial withdrawals occur if, in a given plan year, "(I) there is a 70-percent contribution decline, or (2) there is a partial cessation of the employer's contribution obligation." 29 U.S.C. § 1385(a). A complete withdrawal generally occurs when an employer
"(1) permanently ceases to have an obligation to contribute under the plan, or (2) permanently ceases all covered operations under the plan." Id § 1383(a). Special exceptions exist for the building and construction industry, id- § 1383(b), and the entertainment industry, id § 1383(c).
28. H.R. REP. 96-869, supra note 16, at 65, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2933.
29. 29 U.S.C. § 1399(b)(1).

30. Id § 1399(b)(2)(A).
31. Id § 1401(a). Alternatively, the parties may together initiate an arbitration proceed-
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award, either party can bring an action in district court pursuant to
section32 1451 to "enforce, vacate, or modify" the arbitrator's
award.
II.

STATUTORY AND EQurrABLE APPROACHES TO LIMITATION OF

WITHDRAWAL LIABILITY COLLECTION ACTIONS
Limiting legal claims based on the passage of time dates to the
law of Moses.33 In 1540, England under King Henry VIII adopted
laws which limited possessory actions in real property based on the
passage of a term of years. 4 Personal actions such as torts were
limited only by the maxim actio personalis moritur cum
persona.35 The apparent reason for the subsequent development of
statutes of limitation was the need to protect defendants "against
loss of witnesses and evidence and to protect [their] acts in reasonable reliance on plaintiff's inaction."36 It remains to be seen
whether the statute of limitation applicable to withdrawal liability
cases furthers these original goals.
Before the powers of courts of law and equity merged, statutes
of limitation did not apply in the separate equity courts. Unfettered
by mechanical statutes of limitation, equity courts developed limitation-of-action doctrines that focused on the fairness to the particular
parties as determined by the facts and circumstances unique to the
specific case.3 7 The application of equitable limitation of action
doctrines to withdrawal liability collection actions is complicated
and may be no more adequate a protection for employers than the
statute of limitation.

ing within 180 days of the initial notification of withdrawal liabilities.
32. I. § 1401(b)(2).
33. See Deut. 15:1 (New American Standard Bible) ("At the end of every seven years
you shall grant a remission of debts.").
34. WRIiAM D.

FERGUSON,

THE STATUTES

OF LIMITATION SAVING

STATUTES

7

(1978). Prior to this date, an historical event, such as the coronation of a sovereign,
would be designated as the cut off date. Id.
35. Id. at 9 ("A personal action dies with the person.") (citing Cyclopedic Law Dictionary (2d ed. 1922)).
36. Id. at 43.
37. See Note, Developments in the Law - Statutes of Limitation, 63 Harv. L. Rev.
1177, 1183 (1950) (courts have generally disregarded contract terms which lengthen the
statutory terms in order to avoid due process conflicts and relieve the court of state
claims).
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A Starting Point: The D.C. Circuit's Interpretation
of Section 1451(f)

The controversy over the statute of limitation provisions of
section 1451(f) centers on two competing theories. Plan contributors argue that the limitation period should begin to run from the
moment the employer completely withdraws from the plan.3" This
interpretation has the advantage from an employer's perspective of
accelerating the point at which the employer's liability associated
with its withdrawal terminates. The PBGC and plan sponsors take
the position that the limitation period does not begin until the employer fails to pay the demanded withdrawal liability.39 This interpretation has the effect of significantly extending the limitation
period. At least in theory, a plan sponsor could delay indefinitely
before making the initial notice and demand of the assessed withdrawal liability. The latter interpretation makes it unlikely and perhaps even inconceivable that a fund's right to impose withdrawal
liability will lapse.
The handful of courts that have interpreted section 1451(f)
have adopted the position urged by the PBGC and plan sponsors. 4 In Joyce v. Clyde Sandoz Masonry, the court analyzed the
statutory language of section 1451(f) and concluded that "failure to
pay the sum demanded adversely affected the plan, thus giving rise

38. See, e.g., Joyce v. Clyde Sandoz Masonry, 871 F.2d 1119, 1122 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 918 (1989).
39. See, e.g., Id. Note that in this case, the PBGC exercised its right to intervene in
an action under 29 U.S.C. § 1451.
40. See id.; Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. National
Transit Cartage Co., Inc., Nos. 88-C- 9751 & 87-C-9913, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14689,
1990 WL 179716 (N.D. Ill. October 31, 1990); ILGWU Nat'l Retirement Fund v. Smart
Modes of Cal., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Central States, Southeast &
Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Hribar Trucking, No. 87 C 0168, 1987 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9021, 1987 WL 17848 (NJD. Ill. 1987); Connors v. Darryll Waggle Construction,
Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1188 (D.D.C. 1986). See also Ludington News Co. and Michigan
UFCW/Drug Employers Pension Fund, 9 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1913, 1917
(1988) (Comelius, Arb.) (rejecting the employer's argument that § 1451(c) ought to apply
like a "normal" statute of limitations because "ERISA . . . is not normal"); In re Korman
Corp. and Teamsters Pension Fund of Philadelphia, 10 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA)
1608, 1615 (1988) (Pereles, Arb.) (holding that "no cause of action arises until at least
the employer refuses to meet the demand of the Fund"). But see Connors v. Peles, 724
F. Supp. 1538, 1557 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that the cause of action arises at the time
of withdrawal but failing to explain its rationale beyond an implication that the company
no longer retains control).

264
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to a cause of action." 4' Sandoz involved a masonry contractor
obligated by a collective bargaining agreement that expired on June
30, 1981 to contribute to the Bricklayers and Trowel Trades International Pension Fund. After unsuccessful negotiations with the
union, the employer implemented the final bargaining offer to the
union. This offer did not include an obligation to contribute to the
pension fund. Sandoz continued to file monthly reports to the Fund
after his obligation to make contributions expired, presumably
reporting that the company had no obligations in the given month.
After approximately four years, Sandoz ceased filing reports with
the Fund. In December 1986, Sandoz Masonry dissolved.42
The pension fund apparently ignored the possibility that Sandoz
had withdrawn from the pension plan. The fund took no action to
impose withdrawal liability until July 13, 1987 when it notified
Sandoz of his liability, demanded payment as required by the
MPPAA and filed a collection action in the United States District
Court. 43 Sandoz Masonry, since reorganized as Griffith Masonry,
did not make the demanded withdrawal liability payment.' 4 The
District Court ruled against the fund, holding that section 1451(f)'s
six-year limitation period ran from June 30, 1981, the date of
Sandoz's complete withdrawal from the plan, and that the fund's
rights had lapsed.45
In reversing the District Court's interpretation, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia first examined the language
of section 1451(a) which provides for an action by a plan fiduciary
"who is adversely affected by the act or omission of any party
under this subtitle., 46 In defining when the cause of action arose,
the court sought to determine what act or omission by Sandoz
adversely affected the fund. The D.C. Circuit held that the Fund
was not adversely affected until "the plan [had] not received payments which [were] due and owing.'"' This conclusion plays a
prominent role in the court's remaining assumptions.
In reaching its decision, the court relied upon the distinction
between the existence of withdrawal liability and the ability of a

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Sandoz, 871 F.2d at 1122.
Id. at 1121.
Md.
Id.
Id. at 1121-22.

46. 29 U.S.C. § 1451(a).
47. Sandoz, 871 F.2d at 1122.
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fund to receive payment of the liability. The court cited portions of
section 1401(b)(1) which provide that:
If no arbitration proceeding has been initiated.., the
amounts demanded by the plan sponsor under section
1399(b)(1) . . .shall be due and owing on the schedule set

forth by the plan sponsor. The plan sponsor may bring an
action in a State or Federal court of competent jurisdiction
for collection.4 8
As further support for its holding, the court focused on section
1399(c)(5) which allows a pension fund, in the event of a default
by an employer, to "require immediate payment of the outstanding
amount of an employer's withdrawal liability." 9 According to the
court, under both of the above cited sections, the fund's notice and
demand create the employer's obligation to pay withdrawal liability
and the employer's subsequent failure to make the demanded payments created the fund's right to sue. From that analysis, the court
derived the general axiom, "the failure to pay gives rise to a cause
of action."'
The second distinction between collection and withdrawal liability noted by the court focuses on the circumstances defining
withdrawal and those necessary for a cause of action. Within the
statutory scheme, the date of withdrawal triggers the calculation of
unfunded liability. The plan however, is not owed anyting by virtue of the mere withdrawal, according ot the court. It is only as a
result of the fund's subsequent actions to collect that an employer
incurs a debt to the fund. 1
The actual date of withdrawal may only have significance after
a post hoc determination that a withdrawal did in fact occur. As
the Sandoz court noted, determining the existence of a withdrawal
is much more cumbersome in practice than it appears to be on
paper.5 2 For example, under the special withdrawal provisions relevant to the building and construction industry, an employer withdraws ftom a fund when the employer "ceases to have an obligation to contribute under the plan [and] resumes such work within 5

48. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(b)(1) ("Plan sponsor" and "fund" are synonymous for purposes
of this Note).
49. Il.§ 1399(c)(5).
50. Sandoz, 871 F.2d at 1123.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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years after the date on which the obligation to contribute under the
plan ceases, and does not renew the obligation at the time of resumption. " 5 In the court's opinion, "[to conclude that an event
requiring such a post hoc (and belated) determination triggers the
limitations bar would create, at the least, an unwieldy statutory
collection mechanism. " '4
In the court's view, triggering the limitations period at the
moment an employer defaults "most ensures that plans will be able
to collect the sums that employers owe them."55 This approach is
ultimately justified by the D.C. Circuit on the ground that it comports with one of the more important goals of the Act, i.e., "providing means for recovery and ensuring the financial viability of
the funds." 56 The court broadly interpreted
the Act as "disfa57
vor[ing] impediments to collection.
Other courts have followed the D.C. Circuit's decision in
Sandoz. The Southern District of New York adopted Sandoz's
"well-reasoned and thorough" conclusions.5 . The Northern District
of Illinois has also applied the Sandoz reasoning on two reported,
albeit unpublished, occasions.59 Notwithstanding this acceptance of
the Sandoz analysis, careful scrutiny of the demand-default approach reveals analytical flaws which justify an alternate interpretation. Assessing the deficiencies of the D.C. Circuit's approach
requires a more generalized discussion of the standards of statutory
interpretation.
B. Standards of Legislative Interpretation
The power of the legislature under the federal system greatly
troubled the Founding Fathers.' Unfortunately, however, the
53. 29 U.S.C. § 1383(b)(2).
54. Sandoz, 871 F.2d at 1124.
55. Id. at 1126.
56. Id.
57. Id. (discussing the general policies of ERISA).
58. ILGWU Nat'l Retirement Fund v. Smart Modes., 735 F. Supp. 103, 106 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (discussing when a cause of action arises).
59. See Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. National Transit
Cartage Co., Inc., Nos. 88 C 9751, 87 C 9913, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14689, at *14,
1990 WL 179716, at *5 (N.D. IMI.October 31, 1990) ("cause of action arises when the
employer fails to pay the demanded withdrawal liability"); Central States, Southeast &
Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Hribar Trucking, No. 87 C 0168, 1987 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9021, at *6, 1987 WL 17848, at * 2 (N.D. IIl. October 1, 1987) (cause of action
accrues when "the employer fails to pay the demanded withdrawal liability assessment,"
not on the date of withdrawal).
60. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison) (advocating separate and distinct
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broad power to legislate can only be exercised through the awkward medium of written text. Justice Frankfurter lamented that
"unlike mathematical symbols, the phrasing of a document especially a complicated enactment, seldom attains more than approximate
precision .... A statute is an instrument of government partaking
of its practical purposes but also of61its infirmities and limitations,
of its awkward and groping efforts."
Interpretation is required any time a statute is applied, regardless of whether a dispute exists over the particular application.62
Statutory interpretation is a particularly nettlesome area for the
judiciary because there is a danger of encroaching upon the power
reserved for the legislature.63 In an effort to protect the integrity
of the political balance between the branches of government and to
clothe its decisions with legitimacy, the judiciary relies on certain
established techniques for interpreting statutes.' While courts
commonly resort to these doctrines and techniques of interpretation,
they rarely explain the justification for relying on one technique
rather than another.
1. Plain Meaning and Textualism
Typically, courts resort first to the "plain meaining" of the
language of the statutes they are interpreting. 6 Unfortunately,
some courts hesitate to acknowledge that determining the plain
meaning of a statute is, in fact, a form of interpretation.' The

branches of government as essential for liberty).
61. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV.
527, 528 (1947).
62. See Norman L Singer, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CoNSTRUCTION
§ 45.03 (4th ed. 1984) [hereinafter SUTHERLAND] (discussing the function of statutory interpretation).
63. See id ("[Consistent with a system of separation of powers, it is . . .the function
of the legislature to make the laws but for the courts to finally and authoritatively interpret what the law says.").
64. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 60 U.S.L.W. 4111, 4115 (1992) (Scalia, ., Dissenting)
("By disregarding well-established and oft-repeated principles of statutory construction, it
renders those principles less secure and the certainty they are designed to acheive less
attainable.").
65. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) ("It is elementary that
the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance; be sought in the language in which
the act is framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is within the constitutional authority
of the law-making body which passed it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it
according to its terms.").
66. See, e.g., id.("Where the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise.. ..")
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very act of deciding whether or not a statute or regulation applies
in a given instance is an act of interpretation based on plain meaning.67 While the Sandoz court did not seem to think it was indulging in any extraordinary interpretive gymnastics by basing its
interpretation on the plain language of the statute, the approach
taken by the court is fraught with hidden complexities.
The "plain meaning" of words is not necessarily plain, but
rather is the product of "culture and context."6" As Learned Hand
noted, "[w]ords are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have
only a communal existence; and not only does the meaning of each
interpenetrate the other, but all in their aggregate take their purport
from the setting in which they are used ... .,69 A plain meaning
approach may wrongfully attribute intrinsic meaning to words. 70
Claiming to focus exclusively on the text of a law, a judge interpreting an act based on plain meaning either resorts to a subjective
understanding of the words or refers to outside sources such as
dictionaries. 71 In either case, a plain-meaning approach may lead
to an interpretation different from that intended by the legislature
or understood by the public.72
Often labelled as textualism, literal or plain-meaning interpretation is a highly favored method of determining the meaning of
legislation advocated by both courts and academics.7 3 Textualism

67. 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 62, § 45.03 (discussing the interpretation function).
68. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
405, 416 (1989).
69. NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941).
70. See 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 62, § 45.02 (noting that since not all words have
a single intrinsic meaning, a plain meaning approach to interpretation may not suffice and
other interpretive aids may be needed to discern legislative intent).
71. 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 62, § 46.02 (noting that a judge "cannot help using
what he [or she] has learned about customary language usage and common understanding
associated with the relevant text").
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 469
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (advising that courts "accord proper
respect to the finality and binding effect of legislative enactments"); Mallard v. United
States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 301-03 (1989) (noting that a statute which allows the
court to "request" an attorney to represent an indigent does not enable the court to "require" such representation as would a stronger directive such as "assign" or "appoint");
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statute's Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544-51 (1983) (advocating the view that a statute does not apply unless it clearly supports the court's decision
or power to act). But see, e.g., Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 454 ("Where the literal reading of a statutory term would 'compel an odd result,' we must search for other evidence
of congressional intent to lend the term its proper scope." (citation omitted)); Church of
the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (concluding that courts may
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comports with society's need for definitive statements of the law
enabling citizens to order their daily affairs.7 4 Where the words of
the statute are clear and have only one conceivable or reasonable
meaning, proponents can easily justify using a textualist approach.
The Constitution does not require the degree of specificity that
proponents of textualism advocate. According to the Supreme
Court, "no more than a reasonable degree of certainty can be demanded." 75 The Court has recognized that "few words possess the
precision of mathematical symbols, most statutes must deal with
untold and unforeseen variations in factual situations, and the practical necessities of discharging the business of government inevitably limit the76 specificity with which legislators can spell out
prohibitions."
Even textualism may distort the "precise" intended meaning of
a law. Legislators are as prone as any other writers to grammatical
errors which confuse meaning - perhaps they are even more
vulnerable to grammatical problems.' Irrelevant parts of the statute may be construed to distort the meaning of the passage being
interpreted. Furthermore, judges' interpretations may proceed from
assumptions not explicitly supported by the statutory language. The
subtle danger of purporting to rely on text alone is that rather than
overtly introducing background norms which provide context for
the statute, textualists covertly inject norms and as a result, obscure
the determinative assumptions underlying their decisions. 7
Despite the Sandoz court's elaborate analysis of various
MPPAA sections impliedly suggesting the demand-default interpretation, much of the analysis was predicated on the assumption that
the fund was adversely affected when it was not paid the sums
owed to it under the withdrawal liability calculation. 9 For examdiscount the literal language of statute if giving effect to the general meaning of the
words used would yield an "absurd result"); Sunstein, supra note 68, at 415-23 (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of textualism as a sole basis for statutory interpretation
but emphasizing its inadequacies).
74. See Sunstein, supra note 68, at 416 (stating that "resort to the text promotes goals
associated with the rule of law since citizens have access to the statutory words").
75. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States 342 U.S. 337, 337 (1952). See also
United States v. Article of Drug, 484 F.2d 748, 750 (7th Cir. 1973).
76. Boyce Motor, 342 U.S. at 340.
77. 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 62, § 47.01 (noting that "[a] legislature is not compelled by any superior force to obey the rules of grammar and composition" (footnote
ornitted)). See also Value Oil Co. v. Town of Irvington, 377 A.2d 1225, 1231 (1977)
("[J]ustice should not be the handmaiden of grammar."), aff'd 396 A.2d 256 (1979)
78. See Sunstein, supra note 68, at 417.
79. Joyce v. Clyde Sandoz Masonry, 871 F.2d 1119, 1123 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
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ple, the court observed: "[so] long as the employer does not default in payment, the plan is not harmed by the withdrawal ....
Withdrawal, in and of itself, does not visit any adverse effect upon
the plan that gives rise to the cause of action."' If the weight of
the court's conclusion hinged on an assumption superficially justified by the statement "the statute, it seems to us,
,,I that assumption calls for closer scrutiny.
Using a purely textual approach, the court's conclusion seems
correct. Any reasonable person would probably agree that when a
creditor is not paid a debt, the creditor is adversely affected by the
debtor's default. In the context of section 1451(f), nothing suggests
that this obvious adverse effect is necessarily the adverse effect
relevant under the terms of the statute. The court's analysis is not
consistent with the broader implications of withdrawal liability in
the MPPAA.
Under the Sandoz court's reasoning, a fund is only hurt by a
withdrawal if the withdrawal is accompanied by a default.' Consider, however, the implication of the court's approach given circumstances different from the Sandoz case. If the Bricklayers and
Trowel Trades International Pension Fund had not discovered
Sandoz's withdrawal (a plausible scenario under the circumstances),
and had not demanded the withdrawal liability payment, the court's
reasoning suggests that the Fund would not have been adversely
affected. Yet, the Fund would be liable for the benefits attributable
to Sandoz's employees.
Whether or not Congress intended default on a withdrawal
payment to be the event marking the start of the limitations period
is not clear. But characterizing default as the triggering event is
like forecasting the rain by looking at puddles rather than clouds.
In assessing the security of multiemployer plans, Congress traced
financial instability to employer withdrawal.8 3 Upon withdrawal,
an employer's contributions to the plan cease, compromising the
plan's future solvency." The court's focus on default as the triggering event ignores the causal relationship between withdrawal and

493 U.S. 918 (1989).

80. Id
81. Id. at 1122 (emphasis added).
82. See supra text accompanying note 80.
83. See generally H.RL REP. 96-869, supra note 16 (discussing in various sections the
burdens on remaining participants as employers withdraw from the plan).
84. See supra text accompanying notes 24-28.
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instability which motivated Congress to act.
Falling into the trap described in Professor Sunstein's criticism
of textualism, s the Sandoz court chose between two facially permissible interpretations without providing a rationale for its decision. While the absence of an explanation for the court's conclusion does not necessarily mean that its decision was unprincipled,
the oversight or omission may be a signal that the court actually
indulged in an undisclosed value judgment motivated by "policy
intuitions of a legisaltive character.""
2.

Structuralism

In opposition to the fund's textualist position, Sandoz argued
for a structuralist approach. Interpretations which create confusion
or render other provisions of the same act inoperative, redundant or
meaningless are less favored than interpretations which empower all
sections with meaning and significance.8 7 Norms of statutory construction demand structurally consistent interpretations where possible. 8 In a critical discussion of canons of statutory interpretation,
Professor Sunstein praises structural approaches: "Such approaches
promote fidelity to congressional instructions and at the same time
help to make sense of complex regulatory enactments." 89 Sunstein
would reject interpretations that render provisions meaningless as
well as those that only "work against" the underlying provisions.'
However, structuralism, like textualism, is subject to implicit value
judgments.
The Sandoz court's demand-default interpretation of section
1451(f)(1) makes section 1451(f)(2) merely redundant. Section
1451(f)(2), by its terms and position in the statute, is intended to

85. See supra text accompany notes 68, 78.
86. Dewsnup v. Timm, 60 U.S.L.W.4111, 4115 (1992) (Scalia, J.,dissenting) (noting
that these policy judgments are innappropriate).
87. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 741-42 (1989)
(rejecting one proposed construction on the grounds that it would render superfluous exceptions in another definition); Sunstein, supra note 68, at 425 (explaining that under a
structural approach, "[a]n interpretation that would make sense of the statute as a whole
should be adopted").
88. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) ("In construing a
statute we are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used."). But see,
e.g., Jordan v. LeBlanc & Broussard Ford, Inc., 332 So. 2d 534, 537 (La. App. 1976)
("Where words and clauses which have inadvertently crept into statutes are clearly repugnant to legislative intent, such words and clauses may be disregarded.").
89. Sunstein, supra note 68, at 425.
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extend the time-bar in the event that unusual circumstances or
fraud conceal the withdrawal event.9" The demand-default interpretation delays the start of the limitations period until after the fund
takes affirmative steps to collect the withdrawal liability without
regard to the period which elapsed between the withdrawal and its
discovery. Except in cases of gross incompetence, it is difficult to
conceive of a scenario in which, after demanding payment, a fund
would stand by for six years allowing an employer to continue to
default on an amount due without initiating some action to recover.
Yet, under the Sandoz rule, it would only be in such cases that the
period for action by the fund would run out.
The Sandoz court responded to the structural argument by
asserting that section 1451(f)(2) would operate in other types of
cases arising under the multiemployer pension plan subtitle even if
its construction of the limitations period rendered that section inoperative in the case before it.' In cases involving "employer withdrawals, transfers of plan assets, reorganizations of plans, and benefits after termination of plans," section 1451(f)(2) might retain
meaning. 93 This response to the structuralist argument is unpersuasive. Admittedly, when choosing between an interpretation that will
sometimes render a provision meaningless and one which will always render a provision meaningless, the former is preferable to
the latter. Similarly, when the choice is between a decision that
treats sections of a statute inconsistently at times and one that
treats the provisions consistently in all circumstances, the latter
decision should prevail. The Sandoz court failed to explain its
decision in a manner which countered the weight of this argument.
Apparently, the court again injected an undiscussed normative
judgment into its analysis.
3.

Legislative Intent

Among the interpretive techniques available to justify
demand-default approach, the Sandoz court emphasized least
method which arguably had the most significant impact on
decision - legislative intent. The court's views regarding

the
the
its
the

91. 29 U.S.C. § 1451(f)(2). See supra text accompanying note 8 for the language of
§ 1451(f).

92. Joyce v. Clyde Sandoz Masonry, 871 F.2d 1119, 1125 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 918 (1989).
93. Id (listing these examples to emphasize that the subtitle "extends to matters far
beyond collection of withdrawal liability").
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meaning of the text and structural consistency are best understood
in the context of its reading of Congress' intent in enacting the
MPPAA and the statute of limitations. Where the words and context are not dispositive, courts often turn for guidance to the
drafters' purpose in enacting the statute.'
Inquiries into purpose are not as popular today as they were in
the 1950's and 1960's when legal realists dominated the academic
field and condemned the mechanical presumptions of textualism
and structuralism.9 5 Regard for Congress' intent is mandated by
the separation of powers doctrine.' Even where courts follow the
rule that "statutes in derogation of the common law are to be
strictly construed," interpretations should not defeat the clearly
expressed legislative intent of the enactment's scope and purposeY
Congress' intent, however, is often unclear. In Fishgold v.
Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp.,98 Judges Hand and Chase
reached different conclusions about the interpretation of "discharge"
under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended
in 1944." According to the relevant passage, returning veterans
were entitled to "a position of like seniority, status, and pay" unless changed circumstances made those benefits "impossible or
unreasonable" for the employer to provide."°c The Act also provided job security to the extent that the returning veteran could
"not be discharged from such position without cause within one
year after such restoration." 1 ' The split between Hand and Chase
centered on the meaning of "discharge." The plaintiff, Fishgold,
had been temporarily laid-off on three occasions within one year
after his return to employment; he sued claiming that these short

94. SUTHERLAND, supra note 62, § 48.01.
95. See Sunstein, supra note 68, at 426.
96. 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 62, § 46.03 (explaining that the separation of powers
doctrine prohibits the judiciary from acting as the lawmaking body by implementing its

own will.)
97. Jamison v. Encamacion, 281 U.S. 635, 640 (1930); see also Isbrandtsen Co., Inc.
v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952) ("Statutes which invade the common law or the
general maritime law are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of longestablished and familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.").
98. 154 F.2d 785 (2d Cir.), aft'd, 328 U.S. 275 (1946).
99. Id. at 788, 792 (construing Pub. L. No. 783, 54 Stat. 884 (1940) as amended in
1944).
100. Selective Training Act § 8(b), 54 Stat. at 890.
101. M, § 8(c), 54 Stat. at 890.
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term layoffs constituted discharges under section 8(c) of the
Act.10 In laying off Fishgold, Sullivan Drydock preferred nonveteran employees with greater seniority than the plaintiff. Fishgold
made no allegation that Sullivan Drydock violated the seniority,
status or pay requirements of section 8(b)." 3
In defining "discharge," Judge Hand and the majority measured
Congress' intent against pre-existing employment law."°4 Hand
argued that the discharge protection afforded veterans employed in
non-union shops the same kind of protection as their brothers
working under collective bargaining agreements. 5 Hand's interpretation was consistent with the apparent overall intent of the Act
"that the veteran was to be assured of his job, . . .but that the job
to which he was 'restored' . . . was to be subject to the same
conditions to which the old job had been subject."" °
In contrast, Chase argued that Congress wanted to assure veterans of "an actual job with actual pay on which they could live at
least for a year." 1°7 Chase's interpretation is much more pragmatic than Hand's, as it imputes to Congress the simple but
emminently practical end of assuring the verterans' economic vitality for one year through a guaranteed job. In contrast, Hand seemed
to impute to Congress the more limited goal of changing a legal
term of employment contracts - granting veterans in non-union
shops the same job protection commonly afforded all employees in
union shops. 0 8 Professor LaRue suggests that whether a judge
prefers a pragmatic, result-oriented approach like Chase's to a
legalistic, rule-oriented approach like Hand's may depend upon the
judge's personal experience. Judges who come to the bench after
service in politics or public affairs will, according to Professor
LaRue, "naturally tend to inquire into the social policy behind a
statute rather than into the way the statute changes the prior
law." 9 Among contemporary judges, the Chase approach will be
dominant.1 0 As long as there is room for a substantial dichotomy

102. Fishgold, 154 F.2d at 787.
103. Id.
104. See LaRue, Statutory Interpretation:Lord Coke Revisited, 48 U. PiTT. L. REV.733,
751 (1987).

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Fishgold, 154 F.2d at 788.
Id.
Id. at 792 (Chase, J.,dissenting).
See LaRue, supra note 104, at 751.
Id at 752.
Id (noting that "most judges are selected for distinguished service in political
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among jurists, however, subjective norms will continue to encroach
into judicial interpretation. Like the other previously discussed
techniques, interpretation based on legislative purpose permits the
courts1 to interpose critical subjective judgments into their analy11
ses.
Assessing legislative purpose is often more difficult than the
other methods of statutory construction. Whereas textualism and
structuralism focus on a defined and discrete body of material, the
range of speeches, committee reports and position papers courts can
consult to determine legislative intent is virtually bewildering. Further complications arise when courts attempt to unravel congressional intent by examining statements made by individual members.
The comments of a bill's most vocal proponent may not reflect the
views of the majority of the legislature. Moreover, statements attributed to individual members of Congress may actually be the
positions advocated by special interest groups packaged in the form
of speeches and comments and supplied to the members to deliver
or insert in the CongressionalRecord."2
Justice Scalia, cognizant of both the distortions created by
legislative history and the complexity it injects into the law, is
leading a one-man assault from the high Court against purpose
inquiries. According to Justice Scalia, the case against such inquiries is simple and obvious. Construing a treaty he asserted:
[t]he critical question.., is [W]hether [giving effect to
"the intent of the... parties"] is more reliably and predictably achieved by a rule of construction which credits,
when it is clear, the contracting sovereigns' carefully

matters and public affairs" and observing that our judges tend to come to the bench with
a "pragmatic judicial philosophy").
111. See supra text accompanying notes 65-78, 87-90.
112. Sunstein, supra note 68, at 429. Sunstein quotes Rep. Heckler acknowledging that
the Congressional Record masks the fact that some views are not asserted during the
debate the statements may appear to affect.
Mr. Speaker, having received unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the

RECORD, I would like to indicate that I am not really speaking these
words .... As a matter of fact, I am back in my office typing this out on
my own hot little typewriter .... Such is the pretense of the House that it
would have been easy to just quietly include these remarks in the RECORD,
issue a brave press release, and convince thousands of cheering constituents that
I was in there fighting every step of the way, influencing the course of history
in the heat of the debate.
120 CONG. REC. 36,506 (1971) (statement of Rep. Heckler).
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framed and solemnly ratified expression of those intentions
and expectations, or rather one which sets judges in various
jurisdictions at large to ignore that clear expression and
discern a "genuine" contrary
intent elsewhere. To ask that
113
question is to answer it.

When parties' (whether they are sovereigns negotiating a treaty
or legislators drafting laws) intentions and expectations are not
clear from the text of their documents, a court may have to rely
on extraneous information to construe them. With respect to these
situations, Justice Scalia condemns the use of certain traditional
sources for defining intent. For example, a key issue in Green v.
Bock Laundry Machine Co.,1 1 4 was the definition of "defendant"

as it was used in Federal Rule of Evidence 609. The majority
spent four-fifths of its analysis tracing the history of the rule from
the 1942 Model Code of Evidence through a 1970 statute, committee and subcommittee reports and congressional debates. 115 Justice
Scalia, concurring in the judgment, argued that this analysis had no
probative value; he saw "no reason to believe that any more than a
handful of the Members of Congress who enacted Rule 609 were
aware of its interesting evolution from . the 1942 Model
Code ....

6 He maintained that courts should determine mean-

ing through two inquiries. First, courts should ask which interpretation is "most in accord with context and ordinary usage, and thus7
most likely to have been understood by the whole Congress.""1
Second, courts should consider which interpretation is "most com-

113. United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 371 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (interpreting the Convention Respecting Double Taxation, Mar. 4, 1942, United States-Canada,
art. XIX, XXI, 56 Stat. 1405-06). See also Union Bank v. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. 527, 534
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (complaining about lawyers and judges, specifically including the court of appeals, who make and entertain arguments over applying statutes in a
manner contrary to the "plain text"). For cases reflecting Justice Scalia's concern about
complexity in the law, see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415-16 (1989)
(Scalia, I., dissenting) (discussing the federal sentencing guidelines); Agency Holding Corp.
v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 170 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (calling for a
state statute of limitation or no limitation period when a federal statute does not explicitly
include a time-bar).
114. 490 U.S. 504 (1989) (holding superceded by amendment to FED. R. EVID. 609
which became effective in 1990).
115. Id. at 527-28 (Scalia, I., concurring).
116. Id. at 528. Scalia asserts that "[tihe meaning of terms on the statute books ought
[not] be determined . . . on the basis of which meaning can be shown to have been
understood by a larger handful of the Members of Congress .... " la
117. Id. (emphasis supplied).
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patible with the surrounding body of law into which the provision
must be integrated - a compatibility which by a benign fiction,
we assume Congress always has in mind." 18
Justice Scalia overstates his case." 9 Legislative history can
offer important insights about a law and may be decisive in some
instances. Scalia's arguments, however, point out the potential for
subjectivity in construction.'O The legislature's purpose in enacting the MPPAA should not have been dispositive of the limitations
issue in Sandoz. While the court stated succinctly Congress' goal
"to ensure the financial integrity of multiemployer pension
funds" - it appears to have ignored the fact that Congress applied
a time-bar to the withdrawal liability provisions which suggests that
its members anticipated some circumstances under which a party's
rights would lapse. Adopting an interpretation which eliminates all
practical significance of a Congressional enactment no more furthers the legislature's purpose than ignoring Congress' directions
altogether.
C. Equitable Limitation of Action Doctrines
As long as the Sandoz decision remains the interpretive standard for the section 1451(f) statute of limitations, defendants must
advance equitable defenses to bar collection actions. The two principle affirmative defenses against delay are laches and equitable
estoppel. However, an employer is unlikely to succeed against a
claim for withdrawal liability asserting either defense.
1. Laches
English chancery cowrts of the eighteenth century created the
doctrine of laches. First described in a hypothetical in Booth v.
21
laches is a formal statement of the princiEarl of Warrington,1

118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
See Sunstein, supra note 68, at 430 (criticizing Scalia's extreme position).
See supra text accompanying notes 95-111.
2 Eng. Rep. 111 (1714). The court offered the following hypothetical:

A fraudulently stated that B had procured a beneficial marriage for C, and
obtained from C a bond for 1000 guineas in favour of B for his services. The
bond was paid, but nine years later C discovered the whole matter to be a
fraudulent misstatement by A, and that A had really received the money. A
was ordered to repay C the whole of the money with interest and costs.
Id See also G.W. KEETON, AN INTRODUCTION TO EQUITY 73 (2d ed. 1948) (citing
Booth).
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ple that an equity court will refuse "its aid to stale demands, where
the party slept upon his right, and acquiesced for a great length of
time."" American courts have described the doctrine of laches
as "an equitable doctrine intended to prevent one who has not been
diligent in asserting a known right from recovering at the expense
of one who has been prejudiced by the delay." 12
The application of a statute of limitation is distinguishable from
laches on the ground that the mere passage of time under a statute
of limitation may bar an action while under laches, the delay is not
dispositive. Where laches is raised, the court must inquire into the
effect of the delay."2 Specifically, a defendant asserting the laches defense must demonstrate that she suffered actual harm or
prejudice from the plaintiff's delay in bringing the action and that
the delay was unreasonable." For example, if a company had
withdrawn from a pension plan but had not been notified of its
withdrawal liability until after the company had changed hands, the
subsequent owner, unaware of the liability, would be disadvantaged
because the terms of the sale agreement would not have reflected
the withdrawal liability.
Several issues arise when a defendant asserts laches as a defense to a fund's demand for withdrawal liability. A court must
determine whether or not the facts show that the fund's delay in
notifying the defendant of its withdrawal liability harmed the defendant. If the alleged harm resulted from a buyer's or seller's purported reliance on the absence of notice as evidence of a lack of
withdrawal liability, the court will have to determine whether the
employer's reliance on the fund's silence was reasonable and in
good faith.I26 However, before a court can reach these particular

122.

Smith v. Clay, 27 Eng.

Rep. 419,

420 (1767).

Lord Camden explained that

"[n]othing can call forth [a court of equity] into activity, but conscience, good faith, and
reasonable diligence; where these are wanting, the court is passive, and does nothing." Id
See also R.E. MCGARRY & P.V. BAKER, SNELL'S PRINCIPLES

OF EQUITY 37 (1966)

(quoting Smith).
123. Aronovitch v. Levy, 56 N.W.2d 570, 574 (Mlfnm. 1953).
124. United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 229 F. Supp. 544, 546
(S.D.N.Y. 1964). See also Niner v. Hanson, 142 A.2d 798, 803 (Md. 1958) ("(I]t is well
settled that the mere lapse of time will not bar the suit, but that there must be a showing
of prejudice to the opposite party by reason of the delay, or circumstances maldng it
inequitable to entertain the suit.").
125. See Brentwood Fin. Corp. v. Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund,
902 F.2d 1456 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that because Funds are not permitted to charge
interest for pre-notice delays, the employer was not financially burdened by the delay).
126. The principle that a party "who comes into equity must come with clean hands"
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factual inquiries, it must resolve the broader question of whether
laches is a bar in the face of an unexpired statute of limitation.
The United States Supreme Court in Holmberg v. Armbrecht
expressed the general rule that a "Congressional statute of limitation is definitive."" 7 According to the court, "if Congress explicitly puts a limit upon the time for enforcing a right which it
created, there is an end of the matter." Appended to this doctrine is a high regard for the flexibility of equity rules.129 For example, courts may invoke equitable principles to extend the limitations period in certain circumstances. "[W]here a plaintiff has been
injured by fraud and 'remains in ignorance of it without any fault
or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does
not begin to run until the fraud is discovered.

.

. """

More-

over, the Court declared that "[t]his equitable rule is read into
131
every federal statute of limitation.
Having afforded equitable protection to plaintiffs whose actions
would otherwise commence outside the terms defined by Congressionally enacted statutes of limitation, it is by no means clear
whether defendants may claim comparable equitable protection
within the limitations period created by federal statute. Courts have
concluded that while equity principles may justify extending the
period of time for actions initiated within a statute of limitation,
compliance with the statutory period is by definition, never
inequitable." In most of the withdrawal liability cases in which
defendants asserted laches as defense, courts have adopted the latter
33
position.1

bars any relief in equity to a party that has not acted legally and in good faith. GEORGE
L. CLAK, PRINCPLES OF EQUITY 34 (1937).
127. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946).
128. ld
129. Id. at 396 (CEquity eschews mechanical rules; it depends on flexibility.").
130. Id at 397 (quoting Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 348 (1875)).
131. Id at 397 (emphasis added).
132. E!g., United States v. RePass, 688 F.2d 154, 158 (2d Cir. 1982) ("Laches is not a
defense to an action filed within the applicable statute of limitations.") (citing United
States v. Mack, 295 U.S. 480, 489 (1935)).
The Supreme Court adopted a definition of laches comparable to that of the old
equity courts. Galiher v. Cadwell, 145 U.S. 368, 373 (1892). The Court explained that
-laches is not like limitation, a mere matter of time; but principally a question of the
Inequity of permitting the claim to be enforced - an inequity founded upon some change
in the condition or relations of the property or the parties." Id (emphasis added).
133. See, e.g., Combs v. Western Coal Corp., 611 F. Supp. 917, 920 (D.D.C. 1985)
(concluding that laches is unavailable as a defense if the § 1451(0 limitations period has
not expired) (citing RePass, 688 F.2d at 158).

280

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:255

Nevertheless, the issue of laches in the context of withdrawal
liability cases remains open to controversy largely because of an
unequivocal Tenth Circuit decision holding that "[t]he defense of
laches is available in a suit to collect a claim for withdrawal liability."" 3 As if its position was not clear, the court noted two contrary decisions in district courts from different circuits and caustically observed, "[i]n this circuit, however, laches and a statute of
limitations are not mutually exclusive, even when the statute has
been made specifically applicable to the claim and the claim was
brought within the statutory period."' 35 One is left wondering, in
the face of this decisive language, which side is correct?
The authority cited by the Tenth Circuit is unpersuasive. The
first case on which Centric relies is ILGWU Nat'l Retirement Fund
v. Levy Bros. Frocks.136 In Levy Bros., the Second Circuit considered whether a one-year delay between an employer's going out of
business and the fund's initial notice of withdrawal liability constituted a delay sufficient to merit barring the fund's claim under the
doctrine of laches" 3 7 The court concluded "that [the plan
sponsor's] delay was so unreasonable as to support a defense of
laches."' 3' The Levy Bros. court reached this conclusion after
considering three factors: first, the claim had been brought well
within the statutory period prescribed by 29 U.S.C. § 1451(f);
second, the plan's task was intricate and complicated because of
the statute; and third, Congress intended to help plans collect withdrawal liability. 139 The Tenth Circuit undoubtedly concluded that
Levy Bros. supports application of the laches defense because the
opinion did not foreclose that possibility entirely. The Levy Bros.
court rejected laches on the basis of the facts before it but did not
reject laches as a matter of law."4 While this interpretation of
Levy Bros. is plausible, it is equally plausible that the court, lacking facts sufficient to resolve the issue, chose not to address the

134. Trustees of the Centennial State Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Centric Corp.
(In re Centric Corp.), 901 F.2d 1514, 1519 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 145
(1990).
135. Id at 1519 n.4 (citing Armstrong v. Maple Leaf Apartments, Ltd., 622 F.2d 466,
472 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 901 (1980)).
136. Id at 1519 (citing ILGWU Nat'l Retirement Fund v. Levy Bros. Frocks, Inc., 846
F.2d 879, 887 (2d Cir. 1988)).
137. Levy Bros., 846 F.2d 879, 887 (2d Cir. 1988).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See Centric, 901 F.2d at 1519.
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broader legal question of whether laches is an appropriate defense
against a claim for withdrawal liability.
Even if Levy Bros. would permit a laches defense, the factors
on which the Second Circuit relied in reaching that decision are
not those of a traditional laches inquiry. The first factor, filing a
claim within the statutory period, could, depending on the weight
accorded that time frame, practically preclude a laches defense.141
Second, the court's consideration of Congress' intent in creating
the claim also focuses the court's equity inquiry on the statute
rather than on the parties. Finally, the equity inquiry is deficient
because the court did not inquire into the effect of the plaintiff's
delay on the defendant. Levy Bros. does not explicitly endorse the
proposition to which the Tenth Circuit appended it and the posture
of the court in Levy Bros. is at best weak support for the Tenth
Circuit's conclusion.
The second authority cited by the Tenth Circuit, Central States
Pension Fund v. Lloyd Sztanyo Trust, 142 is even less supportive
of the court's position than Levy Bros. The court in Sztanyo Trust
declined to strike the laches defense on a motion for summary
judgment "because it was not clear how laches was being applied
by the defendants or whether the defense was indeed patently
defective."143 Although the court cited a case as authority for the
proposition that laches may be an appropriate defense to a legal
claim, 1" the cited case was irrelevant to the question at hand because it did not involve a statute of limitation. 4 '
The quality of Jaspan v. Certified Industries, Inc., 4 as authority for the Centric decision is similar to Levy Bros. Like Levy
Bros., the Jaspan court found no genuine issue of fact which
would support a laches defense. Thus, the Jaspan decision supports
the Tenth Circuit only to the extent that the court did not rule that
laches was unavailable as a matter of law.147
The Tenth Circuit referred to additional authority similar to
those cases already discussed.14 Both Wyoming Laborers Health

141. See supra text accompanying note 132.
142. 693 F. Supp. 531, 541 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
143. Id.
144. Id. (citing Harris v. Beynon, 570 F. Supp. 690, 692 (N.D. Iii. 1983)).
145. See Harris, 570 F. Supp. at 692 (a 28 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against jail officials
for actions committed 16 years prior to the claim).
146. 645 F. Supp. 998, 1007 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), cited in Centric, 901 F.2d at 1519.
147. Id.
148. Centric, 901 F.2d at 1519.
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& Welfare Plan v. Morgen & Oswoode Constr. Co. 149 and Iron
Workers Fund v. A & P Steel, Inc.,"5 upheld decisions by district courts rejecting laches defenses because the defendants failed
to establish "that the plaintiff had full knowledge of the facts and
unreasonably delayed assertion of its rights, which caused prejudice
to the defendant."''
That the authority cited in Centric tacitly
approved the laches defense is dubious since none of the cases
rejected the defendant's laches claim on the basis of the equities.
The two contrary decisions derisively answered in Centric 2
reach the same result as the other cited authority, but take the legal
analysis just discussed a step further. Robbins v. Pepsi-Cola Metro.
Bottling Co. 53 involved a two-year delay between the employer's
withdrawal from a multiemployer pension plan and the plan's notice of withdrawal liability. Under the circumstances, the delay
probably was not unreasonable for the purpose of finding laches.
The court noted that "Pepsi's alleged partial withdrawal in 1981
occurred roughly one year after the MPPAA was enacted. Given
the complicated nature of the Fund's claim against the entire group
alleged to be a "controlled group" as defined in 29 U.S.C.
§ 13101(b)(1), some delay in implementing the new statute was to
be expected."" 5 Moreover, a definitive decision on the reasonableness of the delay was not necessary in Robbins because the
defendant failed to establish any prejudice resulting from the allegedly unreasonable delay. Had the Robbins court ended its treatment
of laches with these factual conclusions, its opinion would be indistinguishable from the cases cited in Centric as favorable authority. Robbins went further, however, affirming the position first
taken in Combs v. Western Coal Corp.55 that a defendant in a
case for collection of withdrawal liability cannot rely on laches
when the statute of limitation has not expired. 6
The Combs court rejected the laches defense because, as a
matter of law, laches is not a bar to an action brought within an

149. 850 F.2d 613 (10th Cir. 1988).
150. 812 F.2d 1518 (10th Cir. 1987).
151. Id. at 1529. The Morgen & Oswoode court refused to attribute knowledge to the
Union because "it [could not] be assumed that the Union's interest in pursuing the matter
was identical to that of the Trustees." Morgen & Oswoode, 850 F.2d at 624.
152. See supra text accompanyirng note 135.
153. 636 F. Supp. 641, 681 (N.D. Ill.
1986).
154. Id. at 681 n.6.
155. 611 F. Supp. 917 (D.D.C. 1985).
156. Robbins, 636 F. Supp. at 681 n.6.
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applicable unexpired statute of limitation.'57 The court relied on
United States v. Repasss8 and United States v. Mack,'59 the latter case referring to early Supreme Court jurisprudence on the subject of laches set forth in Cross v. Allen.' 60 In Cross, the Court
considered whether certain acts by a principal debtor kept alive a
lien on his deceased wife's property After determining on the
basis of common law doctrines that a statute of limitation would
not have barred the claim, the Court addressed laches.
The question of laches and staleness of claim virtually falls
with that of the defence of the statute of limitations. So
long as the demands secured were not barred by the statute
of limitations there could be no laches in prosecuting a suit
upon the mortgages to enforce those demands.'
Notwithstanding the Tenth Circuit's apparent certainty of its
position, the authority it cites m Centric vanes from moderately
persuasive to downright Irrelevant. The decision asserts that
"[laches is just as applicable to a delay in re-initiating litigation as
it is to a delay in initiating litigation," and cites the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments to support this proposition.162 Notwithstanding the court's reference to it, the Restatment adds nothing to
the Centric decision because the Restatement is completely silent
on the single germane point m the case - how laches is applied
in the initial litigation." Another case cited in Centric, In re
Whitney-Forbes, Inc.," applied laches to initial litigation. The
decision however, is inapposite because it did not involve a statute
of limitations question.' 65 Similarly, Coleman v. Black is not on
point because the case did not involve a conflict between a statute
of limitations and a laches defense."6 Thus, while the Tenth

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Combs, 611 F. Supp. at 920.
688 F.2d 154 (2d Cir. 1982). See also supra text accompanying note 132.
295 U.S. 480, 489 (1935).
141 U.S. 528, 537 (1891).
Id.
Trustees of the Centennmal State Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Centric Corp (In

re Centric), 901 F.2d 1514, 1519 (10th Cir.), cert denied, III S. Ct. 145 (1990).

163. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20, comment n (1982) (The Restatement notes that in some instances, laches would make a second proceeding unfair, but it
does not discuss the laches defense asserted with respect to the initial litigation).
164. 770 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1985).
165. Id. at 698. In Whitney-Forbes, a bankruptcy trustee sought to have the court vacate
a ten-year old bankruptcy court order approving the sale of a patent owned by the debtor.
166. 663 F. Supp. 1315, 1329 (D.N.D. 1987) (holding that borrowers were barred by la-
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Circuit's opinion appears, on its face, to support availability of the
laches defense, upon closer examination, the decision is not persuasive.
In theory, protecting defendants from unreasonable prejudicial
delays, as the court did in Centric, is no more radical than protecting plaintiffs from the bar of the statutory period when claims are
hidden through fraud - as the Supreme Court did in Holmberg v.
Armbrecht.167 In both cases, the courts constructed judicial standards which altered the content of Congressionally created rights. It
is not clear why the equities in favor of plaintiffs justify judicial
intervention while defendants generally have not merited such
protection. As a matter of practice, applying equitable principles to
limit withdrawal liability actions is particularly appropriate because,
as currently interpreted, the unique operation of the section 1451(f)
statute of limitations, unequivocally favors plaintiffs. Centric at
least leaves open some possibility that in a truly unique setting,
laches will bar a claim for withdrawal liability.
As a final comment on Centric (a decision which appears to
stand alone in barring a withdrawal liability claim for unreasonable
delay prior to the exhaustion of Congress' mandated time-period),
the case involved unique facts that may have carried significant
weight in shaping the court's holding. The Centric Corporation
received notice on April 7, 1983 that it owed the fund $372,775
for withdrawal liability. 68 Centric challenged the constitutionality
of the MPPAA 169 and further argued that even if the Act was

ches from filing a complaint challenging Farmers Home Administration forms and procedures).
167. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946). For a brief discussion of
Holmberg, see supra text accompanying notes 127-31.
168. Trustees of the Centennial State Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Centric Corp.
(In re Centric Corp.), 901 F.2d 1514, 1515 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, II1 S. Ct. 145
(1990).
169. Id. at 1516. It is not clear why Centric objected to the Act. A number of constitutional challenges to the MPPAA have been rejected by the courts. See Terson Co. v.
Bakery Drivers & Salesmen Local 194, 739 F.2d 118, 121 (3d Cir. 1984). The Terson
court held that (a) the withdrawal liability provisions are a rational means to achieve the
valid objectives of the MPPAA; (b) the Act does not violate the Fifth Amendment takings
clause; (c) the Act is not unconstitutionally vague in adopting "actuarial assumptions;" and
(d) the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial and procedural due process are not violated by the arbitration requirement). See also Peick v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 724
F.2d 1247, 1277 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that the withdrawal liability and mandatory
arbitration provisions are not unconstitutionally vague and do not violate the due process
clause, the takings clause, freedom of contract, or the right to a jury trial), cert denied,
467 U.S. 1259 (1984); Republic Indus. v. Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 of Virgina
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constitutionally valid, it did not incur any withdrawal liability because the alleged withdrawal qualified for a special exception.17
The constitutional challenge was dismissed on a motion for summary judgment in April 1985, while the applicability of the statutory exception remained subject to litigation. 171 After Centric
filed for bankruptcy in July 1985, the withdrawal liability litigation
was terminated without prejudice.172 Rather than renew its claim
in district court, the fund elected to pursue collection through a
claim in bankruptcy court; Centric objected to the bankruptcy
claim. 73 At this juncture, the facts are complicated by the failure
of the fund's trustees to comply with local rules requiring them to
request a hearing to answer Centric's objection. Two years later,
acting on Centric's objection, the bankruptcy court resolved the
claims of the creditors by distributing all of the corporation's assets
to secured creditors only. 74
At some unspecified point during these events, the fund's trustees changed legal counsel. On January 29, 1988, the fund sought
to reopen the proceedings to answer Centric's objections to the
earlier claim."7 Although the district court granted the trustees'
motion, the bankruptcy court denied the request. The bankruptcy
court noted that the alleged creditor's actions were the result of
Pension Fund, 718 F.2d 628, 631 (4th Cir. 1983) (upholding the dispute resolution and
retrospective withdrawal liability provisions), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984); Dorn's
Transp. v. LA.M. Nat'l Pension Fund, (Ben. Plan A), 578 F. Supp. 1222 (D.D.C. 1984)
(rejecting arguments that the MPPAA was unconstitutional under the due process clause,
the Fifth Amendment takings Clause and the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial),
aftrd, 753 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Board of Trustees of the West Conference of
Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Ceazan, 559 F. Supp. 1210, 1218 (N.D. Cal. 1983)
(upholding the constitutionality of the MPPAA under the Fifth and Seventh Amendments);
Trustees of the Retirement Fund of Fur Mfg. v. Lazar-Wisotzky, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 35,
37 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (upholding the constitutionality of the MPPAA under the due process
clause, the Fifth Amendment takings clause and the Seventh Amendment right to jury
trial), af'd, 738 F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1984).
170. Centric, 901 F.2d at 1516. Centric claimed exemption under the labor dispute
exception. "Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, an employer shall not be
considered to have withdrawn from a plan solely because . . . (2) an employer suspends
contributions under the plan during a labor dispute involving its employees." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1398(2). See Combs v. Adkins & Adkins Coal Co., 597 F. Supp. 122, 126 (D.D.C.
1984) (explaining that the exception -does not give an employer the unrestricted ability to
permanently cease contributions to a pension plan," but insulates employers from withdrawal liability for temporary interruptions caused by labor disputes).
171. Centric, 901 F.2d at 1516.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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"admitted... simple oversight and neglect." Moreover, the court
found that granting the motion would a) further delay and disrupt
an already complicated and confusing case; b) deplete an estate
that was already unable to satisfy unsecured creditors; and c) suggest that schedules
and deadlines were not important in bankruptcy
76
proceedings.'
Given these facts, the unreasonableness of the delay and the
prejudice to the creditors and the corporation that could have resuited from granting the fund's motion is clear. It is unlikely that
such compelling evidence of the elements of laches will often be
available. The peculiar facts of Centric may explain why the Tenth
Circuit went to such great lengths to string together enough authority to support its decision. The court was apparently unwilling to
scrap a final reorganization plan for the benefit of a pension plan
that sat on its rights.
2.

Equitable Estoppel

Equitable estoppel, like laches, can be traced to the English
chancery courts. The principle of equitable estoppel holds that "a
person who makes an unambiguous representation, by words, or
conduct, or by silence, of an existing fact, and causes another party
to act to his detriment in reliance on the representation will not be
permitted subsequently to act inconsistently with that representation." 177 Lord Coke invoked equitable estoppel when "a man's
owne act or acceptance stoppeth or closeth up his mouth to alleage
or plead the truth." 78 Coke's description overstates the impact of
estoppel; one may continue to tell the truth, even though barred
from asserting a legal right or claim which would be unjust in
light of previous deeds. 179 According to the Supreme Court,

176. Id.
177. HAROLD G. HANBURY AND RONALD H. MAUDSLY,

MODERN EQUITY 848 (Jill E.

Martin ed., 13th ed. 1989) (footnotes omitted). The authors recount Robertson v. Minister
of Pensions, I K.B. 227 (1949), to illustrate the doctrine. Iii at 849. In Robertson, a
military officer relied on a statement by the War Office acknowledging that his disability
resulted from military service and failed to get an independent medical opinion of his
condition. The court held that because of the officer's reliance, the Minister of Pensions
could not subsequently deny the officer's eligibility when the officer "was no longer in a
position to supply the necessary evidence." Id
178. GEORGE T. BISPHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 250 (Joseph D. McCoy ed., 11th
ed. 1931) (noting in 1931 that the doctrine of equitable estoppel was one of "comparatively modem growth" that has "developed largely within recent years").
179. Id. at 250-51.
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"[tlhe vital principle is that he who by his language or conduct
leads another to do what he would not otherwise have done, shall
not subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing the expectations upon which he acted. " so
American courts currently apply a four factor test to determine
the propriety of invoking estoppel:
(1) The party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) he
must intend that his conduct shall be acted on or must so
act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it is so intended; (3) the latter must be ignorant of
the true facts; and (4) he must rely on the former's conduct to his injury."
Underpinning this four part test is the traditional rule of equity
that "something more than simple silence must be shown to support an estoppel."" s Consistent with the focus of modem definitions of equitable estoppel on the conduct of parties involved,183
parties have satisfied this rule by showing that a silent party had a
duty to speak1 " Giving "conduct" the broadest possible meaning
extends courts' discretion to modify rigid rules so that the rules are
most consistent with principles of justice and fair dealing.8 5
The use of estoppel in pension-related cases has produced
mixed results for employers. Defendants have asserted equitable
estoppel as a defense in a number of withdrawal liability cases,
frequently in tandem with a laches claim." 6 Equitable estoppel is
generally rejected by the courts in a paragraph or less, often the
same paragraph in which the laches defense is dismissed. For example in one case, a district court disposed of an estoppel argu-

180. Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578, 580 (1879).
181. Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104 (9th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 882 (1960).
182. Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Dart Indus., 726 F.2d 724, 729 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
183. 3 S. SYMONS, POMEROY'S EQUIrrY JURISPRUDENCE § 802 at 180 (5th ed. 1941)
("Equitable estoppel in the modem sense arises from the conduct of a party, using that
word in its broadest meaning as including his spoken or written words, his positive acts,
and his silence or negative omission to do anything.").
184. See United Amer. State Bank v. Wild West Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 561 P.2d 792,
795 (Kan. 1977).
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., Wyoming Laborers Health & Welfare Plan v. Morgen & Oswoode
Constr. Co., 850 F.2d 613, 624 (10th Cir. 1988) (rejecting this combined defense because
it refused to infer an intentional delay merely from the plaintiff's failure to assert its
rights).
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ment with the remark that it was an "'interesting' problem."187
The court of appeals found that response too cavalier and remanded the case for specific findings of fact as to the elements of
88
estoppel.1

Some courts, however, examined estoppel arguments made in
pension cases more closely. At times, those courts were reluctant to
apply principles of equity out of concern for the actuarial soundness of the plans. 9 However, competing policies have been advanced to justify the opposite result. For example, one court, expressing the need to raise the ethical standards of pension fund
administration, estopped a fund from denying a pension to an
employee previously assured that he would qualify."9 In another
case, a court ordered a pension fund to credit an employee with
the three years of service he needed to qualify for his pension
because the fund's trustees failed to notify the employee that his
employer missed three years of contributions the employer should
have made on the employee's behalf. 91 The court held that the
pension's trustees had a fiduciary duty to "notify pensioners when
their employer jeopardizes their eligibility."" As a result of the

187. See Woodward Sand Co. v. Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund,
789 F.2d 691, 697 (9th Cir. 1986) (referring to the District Court order).
188. 1d The dispute centered on the date of Woodward's withdrawal. Woodward contended that it withdrew before the effective date of the MPPAA and, therefore, avoided
withdrawal liability. Id. at 693. The Union argued that Woodward's withdrawal occurred
after the effective date. IL Furthermore, the Union asserted, even if Woodward withdrew
before the effective date, Woodward was estopped from denying liability because it continued to make contributions to the fund after the date of its purported withdrawal and
after the MPPAA took effect. Alt at 697. Regardless of the facts that may eventually have
been found on remand, the case is noteworthy because the court refused to reject the
estoppel argument out of hand.
189. Phillips v. Kennedy, 542 F.2d 52, 55 n.8 (8th Cir. 1976) (rejecting estoppel argument which was based on an assurance by a union official and fund trustee that
plaintiff's husband was covered by the plan); see also Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d
956, 959-60 (11th Cir. 1986) (refusing to apply estoppel doctrine to enforce oral modifications of a benefit plan because, in part, of the effect enforcement of such modifications
could have on funds available for other plan participants).
190. Scheuer v. Central States Pension Fund, 358 F. Supp. 1332, 1338 (E.D. Wis.
1975), on rehearing, 394 F. Supp. 193, 194 (E.D. Wis. 1975), aft'd, 570 F.2d 347 (7th
Cir. 1977).
191. Rosen v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Union, 637 F.2d 592, 594
(3d Cir. 1981).
192. Id at 600. ("'We do emphasize, however, that it is the duty of the trustees to
verify on a regular basis the eligibility of those for whom contributions are being
made.'") (quoting Phillips v. Kennedy, 42 F.2d 52, 55 n.8 (8th Cir. 1976))); see also
Aitken v. IP & GCU-Employer Retirement Fund, 604 F.2d 1261, 1270 (9th Cir. 1979)
(finding that a fiduciary has a duty to notify plan participants of ineligibility within a

1Mz]

PENSION WITHDRAWL LIABILITY

289

trustees' breach of fiduciary duty, the fund was estopped from
denying the employee's eligibility. 93
For employers contesting claims for withdrawal liability, equitable estoppel is an inadequate defense. An employer attempting to
assert equitable estoppel would argue that 'the fund's delay in demanding payment constituted silence upon which the employer
could rely to conclude that such liability did not exist. The delay
would be "more than simple silence" because the fund's trustees
have a duty to speak, i.e. to demand payment. 194 ERISA imposes
specific fiduciary duties on pension fund administrators and trustees. These duties require pension fiduciaries to act on behalf of the
participants "with the care, skill, prudence and diligence under the
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like
capacity and familiar with such matters would use .... ,195
Failure to promptly collect withdrawal liability is arguably a
violation of the plan's fiduciary duty. Although Congress did not
explicitly address this question, incorporation of the common law
of trusts into ERISA'" implies this construction. Under the common law of trusts, trustees are expected to preserve and maintain
trust assets and to "use reasonable diligence to discover the location of the trust property and take possession of it without unreasonable delay." 197 Accordingly, under ERISA, a trustee must act
"to ensure that a plan receives all funds to which it is entitled, so
that those funds can be used on behalf of participants and beneficiaries." 198 At least one court has questioned a fund's prudence in
failing to properly investigate potential liability."9

reasonable time after acquiring knowledge of the ineligibility).
193. Rosen, 637 F.2d at 600. See also Ellenburg v. Brockway, Inc., 763 F.2d 1091,
1096 (9th Cir. 1985) (considering the employee's estoppel argument but finding that the
facts did not satisfy the elements of the doctrine).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 181-82.
195. 29 U.S.C. § I104(a)(1)(B). The fiduciary standards adopted by Congress were reportedly intended "to make applicable the law of trusts; to prohibit exculpatory clauses
that have often been used in -this field; to establish uniform fiduciary standards to prevent
transactions which dissipate or endanger plan assets; and to provide effective remedies for
breach of trust." 120 CONG. REC. 29,932 (1974) (comments of Sen. Williams, Chair of
the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5177, 5186. See supra text accompanying notes 94-120 for a discussion of caveats against
using legislative history as an interpretive tool.
196. Central States Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985).
197. GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS AND

TRUSTEES

§§ 582-83 (2d ed. 1960).
198. Id. § 571.
199. See Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc. 874 F.2d 912, 918 (2d Cir.
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The fund's duty to act might also be established by an interesting argument which avoids the common law of trusts and focuses
instead on the section 1106(a)(1)(B) proscription against trustees
"caus[ing] the plan to engage in a transaction, if... such transaction constitutes a direct or indirect... extension of credit" to a
contributing employer. 2" Failure to collect a liability owed is an
indirect extension of credit to the employer. Moreover, the credit is
extended at terms highly favorable to the employer because a fund
cannot collect interest on the withdrawal liability."'
To comply with their fiduciary duties, fund trustees must act as
a prudent person would act.2' Courts measure "prudence" according to an objective standard which requires that they determine
"whether the individual trustees, at the time they engaged in the
challenged transactions, employed the appropriate methods to investigate the merits of the investment and to structure the investment." 20 3 Assuming the ignorant failure to collect withdrawal liability qualifies as a transaction, the employer trying to establish
that a trustee breached its duty must still prove that under the
circumstances, a prudent trustee would have acted differently." 4
The likelihood of a successful estoppel defense is significantly
decreased by the difficulty of meeting this requirement.
As previously noted, a duty to speak can elevate mere silence

1989) (holding that trustees breached fiduciary duty by failing to collect contributions
owed the fund for non-union Polish workers on the Trump Tower project).
200. 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(B).
201. See Central Transport, 472 U.S. at 573 (reasoning that prohibition on use of plan
assets by participating employers "create[s] a trustee responsibility for assuring full and
prompt collection of contributions owed to the plan"); see also Katsaros v. Cody, 744
F.2d 270, 280 (2d Cir.) (finding fund trustees directly liable for failure to recover an
abated loan of over $20,000 plus interest), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984).
202. See supra text accompanying note 195.
203. Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1040 (1984).
204. Plan beneficiaries might also sue fund trustees who fail to collect withdrawal liability. In such a case, the employer could be joined as a co-defendant and would be liable
for the debt. See McMahon v. McDowell, 794 F.2d 100, 109-10 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding
that beneficiaries may sue an employer after first demonstrating that trustees have
breached their fiduciary duties) (citing Strable v. New Jersey Brewery Employees Welfare
Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325, 336-38 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 971 (1986)); see
also 4 AUSTIN W. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 282.1 (3d ed. 1967). Scott explains
that where a "trustee holds in trust a contract right against a third person and the trustee
improperly refuses to bring an action to enforce the contract, the beneficiaries can maintain a suit . . . against the trustee joining the obligor as co-defendant." Id. Note, however,
that a trustee may abandon a claim where a suit would be futile and there is no other
method for enforcing the claim. Id.
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to conduct sufficient to support estoppel. 205 That fund trustees are
charged with duties to act is indisputable. Whether or not employers can assert those duties to convert trustees' silence during the
period a demand for payment is delayed into conduct is not
clear.2' 6 If it is the litigants' relationship that motivates courts to
lower the conduct standard such that "mere silence can trigger
estoppel," a plan's delay would remain mere silence as to the
employer and estoppel grounded on the employer's reliance on that
silence would fail.'
The most recent developments in the law of equitable estoppel
have involved the increasing availability of the defense against the
government. 2 e Traditionally, courts rejected equitable estoppel
when asserted against the government because of the "firmly embedded" principle of sovereign immunity.2° Only in cases of "affirmative misconduct," as contrasted with a mere failure to inform,
has the government been subject to estoppel. 2" American courts
have taken the position that "[mien must turn square comers when
they deal with the govennent" 2 ' and that courts must "observe
the conditions
defined by Congress for charging the public trea2 12
sury. i

At first blush, none of these limitations on estoppel is relevant
to a claim for withdrawal liability brought by a private pension

205. See supra text accompanying notes 181-82.
206. Fund trustees' duties are owed to participants and beneficiaries, not contributors.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
207. Nutty v. Jewish Hosp., 571 F. Supp. 1050, 1052 (S.D. 111.1983). See also Annotation, What Constitutes Concealment Which Will Prevent Running the Statute of Limitations, 173 A.L.1.
576, 588 (1948), quoted in Chicago Park Dist. v. Kenroy, Inc., 402
N.E.2d 181, 185 (ill. 1980) (quoted in Nutty, 571 F. Supp. at 1052.).
208. See Note, Estoppel and the Affirmative Misconduct Requirement - Chien-Shih
Wang v. Attorney General 21 CREIGHToN L. REv. 1149, 1151 (1986-87) (explaining that
lower federal courts have begun to reject the traditional rule that the government is immune from this defense).
209. rd. at 1149 nn. 1, 7 & 8; see also David K. Thompson, Note, Equitable Estoppel
of the Government, 79 COLuM. L. REV. 551 (1979).
210. See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5 (1973) (holding
that the government's failure to publicize immigration rights or to have an immigration
officer stationed in the Phillipine Islands during World War II was not sufficient to estop
the government from denying an alien's naturalization petition).
The Courts' reluctance to apply estoppel against the government is predicated on the
concern that "Congress's legislative authority should not be readily subordinated to the
action of a wayward or unknowledgeable administrative official." Schuster v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 311, 317 (9th Cir. 1962).
211. Rock Island, Ark. & La. R.R. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920).
212. Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 385 (1947).
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plan against a private employer. However, to further insure against
the unlikely possibility that an employer could assert a successful
estoppel argument, the plan might advance a couple of theories.
These two creative theories would tie the government to the case
in such a way that an employer arguing equitable estoppel against
the plan would be required to meet the higher standard of conduct
applicable for an estoppel defense against the government.
First, the PBGC is authorized under section 1451 to intervene
in any action under that section.213 If the PBGC were to intervene, its presence in the case arguably would force defendant employers to meet the higher affirmative conduct standard. Second,
even if the PBGC does not formally intervene, the plaintiff could
argue that the court should apply the higher, affirmative misconduct standard because the defendant seeks to thwart Congress'
conditions for paying withdrawal liability. If successful, the defendant would expose the public treasury to increased liability because
the government, through the PBGC, is a quasi-insurer of the pension plan.
III.

A PROPOSAL FOR INTERPRETING SECTION 1451(f)

The failure of equitable defenses to provide any effective protection for employers necessitates a re-examination of section
1451(f). Courts must apply an alternative interpretation that balances the interests of pension plans, which Congress clearly intended
to protect, and employers' interests which, out of fairness, also deserve consideration. While the Sandoz court considered a variety of
interpretive issues before settling on the demand-default interpretation, the analysis was tainted by questionable judgments. Accepting
the D.C. Circuit's assumptions about the importance of having
employers pay withdrawal liability under any and all circumstances,
the demand-default approach is unassailable. On its face, however,
this assumption is of questionable merit. The fact that Congress
applied a statute of limitations to a plan sponsor's actions to collect withdrawal liability supports the assumption that Congress also
intended to place some limitation on a plan's right to payment.
Between the positions argued by the parties in Sandoz, there is a
compromise interpretation that is both consistent with the substantive concerns highlighted by the court and offers meaningful protection to employers.

213. 29 U.S.C. § 1451(g).
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The statute of limitations should run from the earliest point
following a partial or complete withdrawal at which it is practicable for the plan sponsor to give the employer notice of the amount
of the withdrawal liability and to demand payment. The requirement that a plan seek to collect the withdrawal liability as soon as
practicable after the employer's withdrawal is already codified in
the MPPAA.2 14 Presumably employee organizations, covered employees, plan participants and plan beneficiaries2 5 could bring a
suit under section 1451 against the plan sponsor for falling to act
as soon as practicable if those parties are adversely affected by the
delay. In an action by plan participants or beneficiaries, the statute
of limitations would presumably run from the "as soon as practicable" date because it is only from that date that the respective plan
beneficiaries and other relevant parties would be adversely affected
by the plan sponsor's failure to demand payment.
To hold a plan sponsor to one standard vis i vis the class of
plan beneficiaries and to a different standard with respect to the
employer is obviously inconsistent. Disparate treatment of employers, plan sponsors and plan beneficiaries is contrary to the apparent
relatedness of those parties. Section 1451 lists all of the parties
together without distinguishing or elaborating unique status for any
of them. 216 Had Congress intended different presumptions for different parties, section 1451 was the place to record the differences.
Because plans are not permitted to seek interest on withdrawal
payments, there is an incentive for funds to collect the liability
quickly.217 In fact, failure to collect funds due and owing the
pension plan as soon as practicable may be a violation of plan
trustees' fiduciary duty.21 8 Each day that a plan fails to collect

214. 29 U.S.C. §1399(b)(1).
215. See supra the text accompanying note 6.
216. 29 U.S.C. § 1451(a)(1).
217. See Joyce v. Clyde Sandoz Masonry, 871 F.2d 1119, 1127 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 918 (1989) (discussing incentives to plan sponsor.to act promptly, including the possibility that "interest accrued during the period from complete withdrawal to
demand for payment" would be forfeited).
218. See, e.g., Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central
Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 571 (1985) (trustees must "act to ensure that a plan receives
all funds to which it is entitled .... ."); see also Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 874 F.2d 912, 919 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that a longer limitations period applies under ERISA when a breach of fiduciary duty by a fund trustee involves fraud or
concealment); Nichols v. Board of Trustees of the Asbestos Workers Local 24 Pension
Fund, 835 F.2d 881 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discussing trustees' duties under ERISA to the
beneficiaries of a fund).
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that money, the plan is adversely affected to a greater or lesser
extent depending on the amount of liability owed by the withdrawn
employer. The "as soon as practicable" interpretation, therefore, has
the advantage of fulfilling the "adversely affected" language on
which the Sandoz court relied.
The "as soon as practicable" approach also accounts for the
various circumstances that would extend the length of time between
the withdrawal event and the point at which the plan sponsor could
determine the existence of the withdrawal. The employer should be
as aware of the existence of the withdrawal event as the fund;
therefore, the subsequent imposition of withdrawal liability should
not take the employer by surprise. In contrast, the demand-default
approach allows the fund to spring withdrawal liability on employers by seeking payments long after the employers assumed that
their obligations to the plan had ceased. Finally, in the event of
deception or concealment of the withdrawal, section 1451(f)(2)
would extend the limitation period beyond the term of the section
2 19
1451(f)(1) "as soon as practicable" test.
This intermediate approach satisfies textual concerns by drawing guidance from the standards imposed by the statute. It is structurally consistent, giving effect to both sections 1451(f)(1) and
1451(f)(2). The proposed interpretation also does not unreasonably
impede the apparent purpose of Congress to hold employers responsible for their own pension liabilities. The "as soon as practicable" test is superior to the demand-default approach because its
treatment of employers is less extreme. Absent more decisive evidence of Congressional intent, courts should hesitate to assume a
position as prejudicial to the rights of one litigant as the demanddefault approach is to employers.
IV. CONCLUSION

Under the prevailing interpretation of the section 1451(f) statute
of limitations, employers withdrawing from pension plans can
suffer grossly inequitable results. Furthermore, the interpretation
fails to provide any incentive for a pension plan sponsor to
promptly collect the funds that it is owed from an employer. Because common law equity doctrines will not bar claims for withdrawal liability brought under the Act, employers have no remedies
from unfair results when pension plans delay their actions for
219. See supra text accompanying notes 91-93.
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payment.
Courts should formulate an interpretation of section 1451(f) that
reflects the complexity of the liability calculation and sets a defined outside time limit on the period during which the fund can
collect. The proposed "as soon as practicable" test meets this criteria. Moreover, incorporating this test into ERISA is mandated by a
concern for employers who, as evidenced by their withdrawal, may
be facing financial trouble and business downturns. Because the
law already offers strong protections for pensions funds, there is no
need for an indefinite limitation period.
MICHAEL W. KELLY

